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ABIGAIL ALLIANCE FOR BETTER ACCESS TO 
DEVELOPMENTAL DRUGS V. VON ESCHENBACH: ACCESS TO 
EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS: IS ACCESS TO EXPERIMENTAL 
DRUGS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT WHEN IT COMES TO THE 
TREATMENT OF THE TERMINALLY ILL? 
PRESTON W. LESLEY1 
ABSTRACT 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of the law.2 In the two hundred years since 
James Madison authored the Constitution, the United States Supreme Court 
has held that the Fifth Amendment guarantees more than just fair process, 
but also heightened protection against governmental interference with cer-
tain fundamental rights.3  But what is a fundamental right? In the wake of 
landmark Supreme Court decisions, “the rights to marriage, have children, 
direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, marital privacy, con-
traception, bodily integrity, and abortion,” were all deemed fundamental 
rights.4 But what about the fundamental right to medical treatment? Even 
more complex, what about the fundamental right to experimental medical 
treatment? The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act generally prohibits access to 
new drugs unless and until they have been approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).5 However, gaining FDA approval can be a long and 
tumultuous process. For patients with terminal illnesses, the protracted ap-
proval times can end in prolonged treatment options and even death. This 
article presents the conflicting issues that arise when terminally ill patients 
are not afforded the fundamental right to experimental medical treatment. 
PROLOGUE: THE ABIGAIL ALLIANCE 
“This is not just about me. 
This is about so many others.” 
-Abigail Burroughs 
The Abigail Alliance was incorporated in the state of Virginia in No-
vember of 2001. However, the Alliance really started in early March of 
                                                                                                                             
 1. Preston Lesley is a 2017 Juris Doctor candidate at North Carolina Central University School of 
Law. 
 2. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 3. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997). 
 4. Id.at 720, 117 S.Ct. at 2268. 
 5. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(a) (2015). 
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2001 when Abigail, who had just turned twenty-one, had run out of conven-
tional options in her battle against cancer, and was being treated at Johns 
Hopkins Hospital. Abigail’s very talented oncologist urged her to try and 
get the EGFR6 targeted drug C225 (Erbitux) from small Imclone Systems 
or Iressa or very large Astra Zeneca.  Abigail’s cancer cells had a very high 
EGFR expression and her oncologist strongly felt these drugs had a very 
significant chance of saving her life. 
 
Abigail was still strong then as we worked hard and intelligently and 
launched, with Abigail’s involvement and help, a three-pronged approach. 
We lobbied the two pharmaceutical companies with much vigor including 
getting help from some very influential people. Then we worked hard and 
furiously to solicit Congressional help. With Abigail, we launched a media 
effort that resulted in numerous stories in the press. As tired and weak as 
she was, Abigail did multiple newspaper and television interviews. Through 
those difficult times, Abigail’s devoted Mom, Kathleen Dunn, and Step 
Dad, Gene Krueger, did so much to care and comfort Abigail in order to 
help her retain as much independence as possible. 
 
Abigail died on June 9, 2001, just a week and half after doing an exten-
sive interview with Dale Solly of ABC WJLA TV. Abigail’s words in her 
TV piece echoed the Abigail Alliance mission statement when she stated, 
“This is not just about me. I am trying to help so many others.”7 
 
-Abigail’s Father, Frank Burroughs 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To what extent can the terminally ill, in the United States of America, 
pursue experimental medical treatment? When the prognosis is poor, and 
there are no adequate medical alternatives, are the terminally ill afforded a 
fundamental right to experimental medical treatment? 
In Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von 
Eschenbach,8 the Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear Abi-
gail Alliance’s (“the Alliance”) appeal from the United States District Court 
of Columbia, which left the decision that the Alliance had not provided 
                                                                                                                             
 6. Epidermal Growth Factor Receptor. Elevated levels of EGFR, a growth-factor-receptor tyro-
sine kinase, and/or its cognate ligands have been identified as a common component of multiple cancer 
types and appear to promote solid tumor growth. RI Nicholson et al., EGFR and cancer prognosis, Eur J 
Cancer (Sep. 2001),  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11597399. 
 7. Abigail Alliance, Our Story, The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs 
(2001-2009), http://www.abigail-alliance.org/story.php (last visited Feb 5, 2017). 
 8. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 
(2007). 
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evidence of  “a right to procure and use experimental drugs that is deeply 
rooted in our Nation’s history” standing.9 This decision need not, however, 
limit terminally ill patients to await the clinical testing process before gain-
ing access to experimental drugs. The Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and Congress have created several programs designed to provide 
early access to promising experimental drugs when warranted.10 Also, the 
decision left open the option for the Alliance, the FDA, and the scientific 
community to reach an option through the democratic process in the fu-
ture.11 
Medical treatment is continuously improving, and medicine has evolved 
exponentially since the days of treatment by bloodletting12 and dressing 
wounds with turpentine. However, modern medicine, while effective, is not 
a cure-all.13 The decision in Abigail Alliance contains an in-depth analysis 
of the clinical trial process that experimental medical drugs must undergo 
before being made available to the general public. The decision further ex-
pands upon the Court’s rationale for denying the terminally ill unfettered 
access to experimental drugs. Also, Abigail Alliance raises the issue of self-
preservation, a person’s fundamental rights, and the “inevitable tension 
between early availability of products to patients, especially patients with 
refractory disease, and the need to obtain sufficient data to provide a rea-
sonable expectation of benefit and lack of excessive harm.” 14 
This note will focus on the implied historical aspect, and rationale, used 
in the Abigail Alliance decision, as well as the lasting effects the decision 
will have on future medical advancements. This note will further provide a 
factual overview of the case, and summary of the government’s involve-
ment in the regulation of medical treatment in the United States. Finally, 
this note buttresses the Court’s decision to preclude the terminally ill the 
fundamental right to experimental drugs. 
II. THE CASE 
The case stems from a citizen petition the Abigail Alliance and the 
Washington Legal Foundation submitted to FDA in 2003, requesting the 
agency amend its investigational new drug application (IND) regulations to 
create a policy “to grant initial approval for promising drugs, biologics, and 
devices intended to treat life-threatening diseases with unmet needs,” and to 
                                                                                                                             
 9. Id. at 727. 
 10. Id. at 699. 
 11. Id. at 714. 
 12. Science Museum, Brought to Life: Exploring History of Medicine: Bloodletting, 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/broughttolife/techniques/bloodletting (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
 13. Dr. Kirkham et al., Wounds in the Middle Ages 18-20 (2014). 
 14. Letter from Peter J. Pitts, Associate Commissioner for External Relations, Department of 
Health and Human Services, to Frank Burroughs, President, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to De-
velopmental Drugs 3 (Apr. 25, 2003). 
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seek “regulatory changes to permit expanded availability of developmental 
lifesaving drugs following phase one clinical trials and at all subsequent 
stages of the trial and review process.”15 The Abigail Alliance began in 
early March of 2001, when Abigail Burroughs, who had just turned twenty-
one, ran out of conventional treatment options in her battle against cancer. 
Abigail’s oncologist urged her family to pursue experimental treatment, 
which he felt would significantly improve Abigail’s chance of survival. 16 
Abigail and her family launched an extensive effort to obtain the requested 
experimental drug by lobbying pharmaceutical companies, soliciting Con-
gressional help, and rallying to media to her cause. 
Unfortunately, Abigail passed before receiving experimental treatment, 
which may have saved her life. Nevertheless, her fight continued in the 
work of the Alliance. Following Abigail’s passing, the Alliance took their 
fight for experimental drugs to the United States Federal courts. In May, 
2006, following an appeal from the United States District Court of Colum-
bia, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled in 
favor of the Abigail Alliance, and found that the United State Constitu-
tion protects the right of terminally ill patients to access treatments that are 
not approved by the Food and Drug Administration.17 
On March 1, 2007, following an appeal by the FDA, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reheard the case en banc. The 
question presented on appeal was whether the Constitution provides termi-
nally ill patients access to experimental drugs that have passed limited safe-
ty trials but have not been proven safe and effective.18 On August 7, 2007, 
the Court issued an 8-2 decision against the Abigail Alliance, reversing the 
previous panel decision, thereby upholding the District court’s decision that 
found no constitutional right to unapproved drugs by terminally ill pa-
tients.19 
III. BACKGROUND 
1. The Implied Rationale of the Court’s Decision: The Historical 
Aspect 
The overriding tension within Abigail Alliance is the “inevitable tension 
between early availability of products to patients, especially patients with 
refractory disease, and the need to obtain sufficient data to provide a rea-
                                                                                                                             
 15. Hyman, Phelps, & McNamara, D.C. Circuit Court Rules in Abigail Alliance Case; Affirms 
District Court Ruling That There is No Fundamental Right of Access to Experimental Drugs for the 
Terminally Ill, FDA Law Blog (Aug 7, 2007, 10:41 AM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2007/08/dc-circuit-cour.html. 
 16. Abigail Alliance, supra note 7. 
 17. Hyman, Phelps, & McNamara, supra note 15. 
 18. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 697. 
 19. Id. 
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sonable expectation of benefit and lack of excessive harm.”20 But why is the 
United States government so concerned with the possibility of a person 
harming himself or herself when they are on the brink of death? The answer 
to this question may exist in common law, which is the precursor of the 
United States legal system, and the likelihood of “felo de se”, Latin for 
“felon of himself”, the common law legal term for suicide. 21 
In thirteenth century England, suicide, or “self-murder” became a crime 
under common law in England. However, suicide was long condemned as a 
mortal sin in the eyes of the Church.  If a death were to be declared a sui-
cide, the deceased would be denied a Christian burial, carried to a cross-
roads in the dead of night, and dumped in a pit, with a wooden stake 
hammed though the body pinning it in place. There would be no members 
of the clergy and no prayers offered.  This lack of burial was morbid; how-
ever, the punishment did not end with death. The deceased’s family was 
stripped of their belongings and they were escheated to the Crown. As not-
ed by historian Michael MacDonald, “the suicide of an adult male could 
reduce his survivors to pauperism.”22 
The Court’s denial to hear the Alliance’s petition for appeal may also be 
akin to its decision in Washington v. Glucksberg.23 In Washington, a group 
of doctors and terminally ill patients filed suit against the State of Washing-
ton challenging the constitutionality of a law which made it a crime to assist 
another in committing suicide. The district court found that terminally ill 
patients have a liberty interest protected by the Constitution to commit phy-
sician-assisted suicide, and the Washington law violated the Constitution. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, and affirmed the district 
court decision. The State of Washington appealed the decision to the United 
States Supreme Court, which reversed the decision of the district court and 
court of appeals.24 
In Washington, the Court developed a two-part test to determine whether 
a liberty interest is fundamental and protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Constitution.25  First, the asserted right must have historically been re-
garded as fundamental, or as the Court reasoned, “deeply rooted in the Na-
tion’s history and tradition.”26 Second, the asserted right must be carefully 
                                                                                                                             
 20. Letter from Peter J. Pitts, supra note 14. 
 21. Gerry Holt, When Suicide was Illegal, BBC (Aug. 3, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-14374296. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997). 
 24. Washington v. Glucksberg – Washington Law Challenged, Law Library – American Law and 
Legal Information, http://law.jrank.org/pages/24239/Washington-v-Glucksberg-Washington-Law-
Challenged.html 
 25. Id. 
 26. Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1934 (1977) 
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described and defined. The Court concluded that the asserted right to physi-
cian-assisted suicide did not meet either of those requirements. The Court 
reasoned that the right to assisted suicide was not deeply rooted in Ameri-
ca’s history because almost every state and most democratic nations have 
laws banning assisted suicide. Further, “for over 700 years, the Anglo-
American common-law tradition has punished and otherwise disapproved 
of both suicide and assisting suicide.”27 A quote that harkens back to “felo 
de se.” Chief Justice Rehnquist, who authored the majority decision, con-
cluded with the following phrase, “Throughout the Nation, Americans are 
engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and 
practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to 
continue, as it should in a democratic society.”28 
Thus, the Court’s decision in Abigail Alliance, along with the landmark 
decision in Washington v. Glucksberg, which denied the fundamental right 
to assisted-suicide, display the Court’s reluctance to provide an individual 
with the means to commit “felo de se.”29 Also, both opinions reflect the 
Court’s reluctance to make law and provide for the debate to continue in the 
legislature. 
2. Government Regulation of Medical Treatment 
The pillar of the Alliance’s petition in Abigail Alliance was “preventing 
access to experimental drugs for terminally ill patients . . . must be subject 
to strict scrutiny because [it] interferes with a fundamental constitutional 
right.”30 As mentioned above, the Court described its “established method 
of substantive-due-process analysis” as having two primary features.31 As 
stated in Glucksberg, “First, we [the Court] have regularly observed that the 
Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties 
which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition 
and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if they were sacrificed. Second, we [the Court] have 
required in substantive-due-process cases a careful description of the as-
serted fundamental liberty interest.”32 The Alliance argued the govern-
ment’s history, or lack thereof, of regulating medical treatment can be 
found in our Nation’s history and traditions because “the government never 
interfered with the judgment of individual doctors about the medical effica-
                                                                                                                             
 27. American Law and Legal Information, supra note 24. 
 28. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735. 
 29. Id. at 702. 
 30. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 701 
 31. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 
 32. Id. at 720, 721. 
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cy of drugs until 1962.”33 However, the Court in Abigail Alliance provided 
an extensive history of government regulation to counter this argument. 
While the Alliance focused their argument on the medical efficacy (effec-
tiveness) of particular drugs, their argument failed to realize the Nation’s 
regulation of the safety of drugs.  Or as the Court stated, “the Alliance’s 
effort to focus on efficacy regulation ignores one simple fact: it is unlawful 
for the Alliance to procure experimental drugs not only because they have 
not been proven effective, but because they have not been proven safe.”34 
Thus, “in order for the Alliance to succeed on its claim of a fundamental 
right of access for the terminally ill to experimental drugs, the Alliance 
must show not only that there is a tradition of access to drugs that have not 
yet been proven effective, but also a tradition of access to drugs that have 
not yet been proven safe.”35 The Court concluded that the Nation has long 
expressed an interest in drug regulation and provided the following history 
of the U.S. Government’s drug regulation. 
In the early history of the United States, the Court observes not a tradi-
tion of protecting a right of access to drugs, but rather governments re-
sponding to the risks of new compounds as they become aware of and able 
to address those risks. Drug regulation in the United States began with the 
Colonies and States when the Colony of Virginia’s legislature passed an act 
in 1736 that addressed the dispensing of more drugs than was “necessary or 
useful” because that practice had become “dangerous and intolerable.”36 In 
1808, the territory of Louisiana passed an act requiring a diploma before 
permitting pharmacists to dispense drugs.37 South Carolina passed a similar 
act in 1817, followed by Georgia in 1825, and Alabama in 1852.38 In 1848, 
the Import Drug Act, banned “imported adulterated drugs” after a Congres-
sional committee concluded that “this country had become the grand mart 
and receptacle of all the refuse [drug] merchandise . . . not only from the 
European warehouses, but from the whole Eastern world.”39 Congress acted 
again when it passed the Biologics Controls Act of 1902, in response to a 
series of deadly reactions to a tainted diphtheria vaccine that killed children 
in New Jersey and Missouri.40 Thus, the examples presented by the Court 
bolstered the argument that drug regulation is indeed rooted in America’s 
history and traditions. 
                                                                                                                             
 33. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 703. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 703-704. 
 37. Id. at 704. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 705. 
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3. Modern Governmental Regulation of Medical Treatment 
The current regime of federal drug regulation began to take shape with 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FDCA”).41 The FDCA re-
quires drug manufacturers provide proof that their products are safe prior to 
being marketed. Additionally, the FDCA prohibits false therapeutic claims. 
Notably, the drug industry “strenuously objected” to the 1938 Act “ostensi-
bly on the ground that it would deprive the American people of the right to 
self-medication,” an argument not unlike the Alliance’s position of today.42 
Following the Court’s opinion that governmental regulation was histori-
cally rooted in our Nation’s history, the Court tackled modern governmen-
tal regulation beginning with the 1962 Amendments to the FDCA, com-
monly known as the Kefauver-Harris Amendments.43 The Alliance con-
tends that prior to these Amendments, which were enacted in response to 
birth defects in babies whose mother’s had taken Thalidomide to ease 
morning sickness, patients were free to make their own decisions about 
whether a drug may be effective.44 The Kefauver-Harris Amendments set in 
place the extensive, and time consuming method of gaining FDA approval 
we know today. 
As stated above, the method to obtain FDA approval can be a long and 
tedious process.  First, an experimental drug’s sponsor, often a drug manu-
facturer, must submit an application for approval. The application “must 
contain full reports of investigations which have been made to show wheth-
er or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in 
use.” 45  These reports rely largely on clinical trial with human subjects. 
However, before a sponsor can even begin human testing, it must submit an 
investigational new drug application (IND) to the FDA for approval. If the 
IND is approved, several phases of clinical trials can begin.46 The clinical 
trial process averages three phases, which on average last up to seven years 
to complete.47 Phase one consists of a small sample group to determine if 
the drug is safe enough for continued human testing.48 Phase two studies are 
“well controlled” trials used to evaluate both “effectiveness” and “safety” 
with side effects.49 Lastly, phase three is an expanded trial containing many 
subjects to evaluate the overall “benefit-risk” relationship.50 The seven 
                                                                                                                             
 41. 21 U.S.C.A. § 301 (2016). 
 42.  Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 705. 
 43. Id. at 725. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (2015). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Am. Compl. P15. 
 48. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21. 
 49. Id. § 312.21(a)(1). 
 50. Id. § 312.21(c). 
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years of clinical trials, the Alliance argues, is precious time a terminally ill 
patient could be undergoing treatment by the experimental drug. 
IV. FROM EXPERIMENTAL TO EFFECTIVE 
According to Merriam-Webster, the definition of experimental is “...done 
in order to see how well something works.”51 The FDA defines experi-
mental as “any use of a drug except for the use of a market drug in the 
course of medical practice.”52 Where the above two definitions intersect is 
the “use” of the experimental drug in order to test its effectiveness. As pre-
viously mentioned, the FDCA generally prohibits access to new drugs un-
less and until they have been approved by the FDA.53 However, as the Alli-
ance alleged in Abigail Alliance, the experimental process is an “extremely 
lengthy one,” which impedes a terminally ill patient from receiving possi-
bly life-saving medical treatment.54 
Following the Courts historical approach to the Alliance’s argument that 
government regulation of safety and efficacy was not in existence until the 
1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, the Court supported its decision by 
providing a counterarguments to the Alliance’s several common law doc-
trines, which argued that barring access to experimental drugs for terminal-
ly ill patients is “inconsistent with the way that our legal tradition treats 
persons in all other life-threatening situations.”55 The Alliance argued three 
doctrines: 1) the doctrine of necessity; 2) the tort of intentional interference 
with rescue; and 3) the right to self-defense.56 
1. The Doctrine of Necessity 
Looking first to the Alliance’s necessity argument, the Alliance invoked 
the common law doctrine of necessity, which “traditionally covered the 
situation where physical forces beyond the actor’s control rendered illegal 
conduct the lesser of two evils.”57 However, the Alliance offers little detail 
about how necessity would apply to its case. Furthermore, in the 2001 case 
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, the Court made it 
clear that Congress may eliminate a necessity defense that might otherwise 
be available.58 Thus, in light of Congress’s limiting of experimental drugs 
by law, and the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the common law defense 
                                                                                                                             
 51. Experimental, Merriam-Webster, available at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/experimental(last visited Feb.10 2017). 
 52. 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b). 
 53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). 
 54. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 698. 
 55. Id. at 703. 
 56. Id. 
 57. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop, 532 U.S. 483, 490, 121 S. Ct. 1711, 149 L. 
Ed. 2d 722 (2001) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410, 100 S. Ct. 624, 62 L. Ed. 2d 575 
(1980)). 
 58. Id. at 493, 121 S. Ct. at 1719. 
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of necessity remains controversial and cannot override a value judgment 
already determined by the legislature, the common law doctrine of necessi-
ty provides little support to the Alliance’s proposed right.59 
2. The Tort of Intentional Interference With Lifesaving Efforts 
Additionally, the Alliance raised the tort of intentional interference with 
lifesaving efforts, which the Restatement of Torts defines as “intentionally 
preventing a third person from giving to another aid necessary to his bodily 
security.”60 But this doctrine is not analogous to the facts of this case. The 
Alliance seeks access to drugs that are experimental and have not been 
shown to be safe, let alone effective at (or “necessary” for) prolonging life. 
Altruistically, the Alliance concedes that taking experimental drugs can 
“involve enormous risks.” In essence, Alliance insists on a constitutional 
right to assume any level of risk.61 This alleged right to assume “any level 
of risk,” especially an “enormous risk,” set a substantial bar to the Alli-
ance’s argument. 
3. The Doctrine of Self-Defense 
The final, and most interesting, common law argument presented by the 
Alliance centered on the doctrine of self-defense.  The common law doc-
trine of self-defense provides that “one who is not the aggressor . . . is justi-
fied in using a reasonable amount of force against his adversary when he 
reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily 
harm from his adversary, and (b) that the use of such force is necessary to 
avoid this danger.”62 
The Alliance argued that the landmark abortion case of Roe v. Wade, 
which addressed a “right of personal privacy” also gave women the funda-
mental right to abort a fetus at any stage of a pregnancy if doing so is nec-
essary to preserve the life or health of the mother.63 Applying that argument 
here, “the Alliance argues that because its terminally ill members are in 
immediate danger of harm from cancer, they can use whatever medical 
means are necessary to defend themselves.”64 The Court reasoned that the 
Alliance’s argument was not about using force to defend oneself, but about 
the constitutional right to “assume enormous risk.”65 Accordingly, “unlike 
the cases in which the doctrine of self-defense might be properly invoked, 
this case involves risk from drugs with no proven therapeutic effect, which 
at a minimum separates this example from the abortion “life of the mother” 
                                                                                                                             
 59. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 708 
 60. Restatement (First) of Torts § 326 (1934). 
 61. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 703. 
 62. Wayne R. Lafave, Substantive Criminal Law § 10.4 (2d ed. 2003). 
 63. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973). 
 64. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 709. 
 65. Id. at 710. 
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exception.66 In brief, the Alliance’s own acknowledgment that its right 
would involve “enormous risk” sets it apart from the “life of the mother” 
exception, which has been proven effective. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the majority of our Nation’s history the United States Court System 
has attempted to steer clear of decisions, which would “make law” and not 
“decide law.” On August 7, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia continued this tradition by refusing to legislate 
through the Court a new fundamental right to experimental drugs.67 Using 
the Court’s rationale, this decision was made to ensure those with terminal 
illnesses maintain their quality of life, and not expose themselves to en-
hanced risk. 
The efforts of the Alliance are praiseworthy; however, the burden of al-
lowing citizens to expose themselves to detrimental harm would undoubt-
edly fall in the hands of the government.  Accordingly, the government 
enacts rules and regulations to protect its citizens, not intentionally harm 
them. It should also be noted that the government is not the only one in 
opposition to the Alliance’s requests. Other “members of the cancer com-
munity” have suggested that the FDA needs to maintain a strong clinical 
trial system as the basis of the approval of cancer drugs.68  Thus, this inevi-
table tension rests not only in the courts, but the cancer community. 
It was no mistake the Court echoed the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist 
at the close of its opinion, “our holding today ensures that this debate 
among the Alliance, the FDA, the scientific and medical communities, and 
the public may continue through the democratic process.”69 Accordingly, 
not all hope is lost for those who fight for access to experimental drugs 
when faced with certain death. Moreover, the Court has made it abundantly 
clear in the past and present, that this fight will take place in Congress, and 
not the judiciary. 
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 67. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d 695. 
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